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Abstract 
 
 We re-examine whether the broad support for repeal of the estate tax is a result of 
citizen ignorance. We find that increasing information about the estate tax or politics in 
general has very different effects on Republicans and Democrats. While high and low-
information Republicans support estate tax repeal, Democratic support is higher among 
those who know less. However, most highly-informed people in both parties support 
repeal. We also show that standard surveys overestimate the extent of misinformation 
about the estate tax. Therefore, “ignorance” is not a compelling explanation of why so 
many people support estate tax repeal. 
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In 2001, Congress passed and President Bush signed several tax cut bills. One 
target of this legislation was the federal estate tax. Prior to passage of the 2001 bills, the 
tax applied to inheritances of more than $1 million at a rate of up to 56%. The new 
legislation reduces the rate to 45% and increases the application threshold to $3.5 million 
by 2009. In 2010, the federal estate tax disappears altogether. But the law also has a 
sunset provision. Without further congressional action, the federal estate tax returns to its 
2001 levels in 2011. 
When these changes were made, only about 2% of the population paid the estate 
tax at the time of death. The other 98% didn’t pay because their estates weren’t large 
enough. In other words, the estate tax is a very progressive tax. It is also well liked by 
political elites who desire a redistribution of wealth from rich to poor.  
But the estate tax is not well liked by citizens. There is broad public support for 
its repeal. Bartels (2004) reports that almost 70 percent of the public favored repeal in 
2002. Slemrod (2006) finds that 82 percent had this point of view in 2003. And despite 
claims that public opposition to the estate tax was manufactured in the 1990’s by 
conservative interest groups, a more systematic look at the evidence reveals that 
opposition to the taxation of inheritances has been present for decades (Bartels 2006). 
What explains the high level of opposition to the estate tax? One popular answer 
is ignorance. The same surveys that reveal high support for estate tax repeal also show 
that the public is misinformed about who has to pay the estate tax. Scholars have been 
vague about the extent to which people support the estate tax because they are ignorant. 
Slemrod (2006:69), for example, argues that “a popular misunderstanding that the current 
tax system is less progressive than it really is contributes to the widespread opposition to 
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the tax.” Bartels (2006:14) finds that “a substantial number of people support repealing 
the estate tax because they mistakenly believe that their own taxes will be lower as a 
result.” But both authors add caveats to their claims.  While Slemrod (2006:72) concludes 
that “better informed voters would be much less likely to support [estate tax] reforms,” he 
qualifies his conclusion by noting that “a majority would oppose it even in the absence of 
this particular misconception” (2006:69).  Likewise, Bartels (2004) opines that “the 
persistence of strong public support for estate-tax repeal in the face of so many seemingly 
contrary considerations is very hard to square with any notion of public opinion as 
rational or well-integrated.” Yet he sees “no reason to imagine that a general increase in 
political information would, by itself, make the American public any less enthusiastic 
about the idea of repealing the inheritance tax” (Bartels 2005:25).  
Does ignorance cause the public to support estate tax repeal? In what follows, we 
offer a different answer than Slemrod or Bartels. The answer differs for two reasons.  
First, we relax the assumption, made by both Slemrod and Bartels, that all 
citizens’ opinions about the estate tax must respond to more information in identical 
ways. We adopt a different approach, one that allows partisan differences in information 
processing and opinion to emerge, if they are present. In so doing, we follow the insights 
of many scholars including Mark Hetherington (2001), William Jacoby (1988), and John 
Zaller.  
Zaller (1992, 1996) argues that when elites discuss an issue and media cover this 
discussion, people learn about the issue, especially the more attentive among them. The 
strength of this information flow not only affects how much people know about the estate 
tax but also how much they know about the positions that elites, notably the two major 
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political parties, have taken on the issue. These relatively simple pieces of information, 
paired with the credibility of positions advocated by large and politically relevant groups 
of elites, can function as powerful cues in people’s opinion formation and change.  
When the two major parties take different positions on an issue—as they have on 
estate tax repeal—partisan members of the mass public will be more easily persuaded by 
arguments presented by their party, provided that elite messages reach them. Upon seeing 
a Republican consensus on estate tax repeal, and hearing explanations of how the policy 
fits into a familiar political worldview, we would expect attentive Republicans to become 
more supportive of the repeal. Likewise, when attentive Democrats see a Democratic 
consensus in favor of the estate tax, they should become more likely to oppose repeal. To 
the extent that citizens accept only (or mostly) arguments from members of their own 
party, the relationship between information and opinion on the estate tax issue would be 
different than previous writings suggest. Instead of more information about the estate tax 
moving citizens in a uniform direction towards opposing estate tax repeal, it should 
actually increase opinion differences amongst partisans. 
When we incorporate this possibility of partisan differences in information 
processing into a re-analysis of the kinds of claims made by Slemrod (2006) and Bartels 
(2004, 2005), we find that the relationship between information and support for estate tax 
repeal is different than previously reported. In particular, the relationship between 
political information and support for estate tax repeal is not the same for Democrats as it 
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is for Republicans. More information correlates with greater Democratic support for 
retaining the estate tax. It does not have the same effect on Republicans.1 
A second reason for doubting that a public more knowledgeable about who pays 
the estate tax would support it more is the fact that public knowledge of the estate tax is 
not as low as traditional surveys suggest. Respondents’ failure to answer fact-based 
survey questions correctly is partly explained by their low motivation in typical survey 
situations. We demonstrate this effect by experimentally varying respondents’ incentives 
to answer such questions correctly. 
Using a novel experimental design, we show that making small modifications of 
the survey interview environment from which knowledge measures are typically derived 
yields important changes in how well respondents do on such questions. We show that 
for the same kind of question that was used by Slemrod to measure estate tax 
misperception, simply telling survey respondents in advance that they will earn $1 for 
answering the question correctly increases correct responses by more than 30 percent. 
This result suggests that many people do not try very hard when they answer fact-
based survey questions. As a result, existing reports of how little people know about the 
estate tax (and other tax policies) are likely exaggerated by aspects of traditional surveys 
that repress respondents’ motivation to offer correct answers. 
The paper continues as follows. First, we reanalyze the data set used by Slemrod, 
allowing for the possibility that the effect of information depends on partisan 
predispositions. We then conduct a parallel re-analysis of the data Bartels (2004, 2005) 
uses to study attitudes towards the estate tax repeal. Third, we briefly describe the design 
                                                 
1 These results parallel a similar finding on public support for the 2001 Bush tax cuts by 
Lupia, Levine, Menning, and Sin (2006). 
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(Prior and Lupia 2006) that yielded the experimental data and use it to reveal problems 
with common measurement of citizens’ political knowledge. A brief concluding section 
summarizes the argument. 
Information and Opinion on Estate Tax Repeal in the NKK Survey 
In an earlier edition of NTJ¸ Slemrod (2006) analyzed “The Role of 
Misconception in Support for Progressive Tax Reform.” Using data from a survey 
sponsored by National Public Radio, the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, and 
Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government (henceforth, the NKK survey), he 
documents that many citizens are wrong about many aspects of tax policy. In his analysis, 
he pays particular attention to the misconception that the estate tax applies to most 
families. In the NKK survey, 31 percent correctly responded that only a few families 
have to pay the estate tax, 49 percent responded that many families paid it, and the other 
20 responded that they did not know. 
Slemrod then turns to the question of whether this misconception causes people to 
support the estate tax. He shows that support for the estate tax repeal is higher among 
people who believe that most families will have to pay it. He concludes (2006:69) that 
incorrect information on this point increases the likelihood of favoring the repeal by 10.3 
percent. 
We contend that the effect of the misconception on support for the repeal is far 
more limited in scope than Slemrod suggests: it only applies to some partisans. To assess 
our contention empirically, we replicate Slemrod’s analysis using the NKK data and then 
change one assumption – that Democrats and Republicans who can answer the fact-based 
question correctly are affected in identical ways by such information. 
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In Figure 1, we depict the relationship between responses to the NKK question 
about how many families pay the estate tax and respondents’ support for the policy. The 
figure shows the relationship for three sets of respondents: the sample as a whole, 
respondents who identify with the Democratic Party, and respondents who identify with 
the Republican Party.2 
[Figure 1 about here.] 
The results show that – on average – people who answer the NKK factual question 
correctly are less likely to support estate tax repeal. The effect is quite different for 
Democrats and Republicans, however. For Democrats, the difference between knowing 
the answer to the factual question and not knowing it corresponds to a 27 percentage 
point decrease in supporting estate tax repeal. For Republicans, the difference is only 
seven percentage points.  
For Democrats, knowing whether or not the estate tax is paid by very few families 
is consequential. However, it is worth noting that roughly half of all Democrats who 
answer the NKK question correctly, and who state a policy opinion, support repeal – 
along with 84 percent of knowledgeable Republicans. By this measure, many well-
informed people support repeal. The idea that people support repealing the estate tax 
because they have a misconception about who pays it is limited to Democrats and even 
with such information about half of them continue to support repeal. 
So far, our analysis does not control for alternative influences on estate tax 
opinion. In Table 1, we add control variables. The model in Table 1 analyzes the same 
                                                 
2 We count “partisan leaners”—respondents who initially consider themselves 
independents, but report feeling closer to one party—as partisans. Democrats (n = 573) 
make up 43% of the sample (N =1330); Republicans (n = 514) make up 39%. 
 8
NKK data using the ordinary least squares regression model that Slemrod employed to 
identify the effect of misperception on support for estate tax repeal. Both the original 
model and our version contain a long list of additional variables controlling for factors 
such as education and income. The first column yields coefficients for the NKK sample 
as a whole. It shows a significant effect of believing that “most families have to pay the 
estate tax,” Slemrod’s measure of estate tax misconception. Based on this effect, Slemrod 
concludes that misconceptions about the estate tax fuel support for its repeal.  
While Slemrod’s empirical model includes partisanship as an explanatory 
variable, partisanship is not interacted with the misconception measure. This modeling 
choice implies that the effect of information on opinion is the same for all respondents 
regardless of their partisanship. It contradicts the partisan-information processing 
explanation offered by Zaller (1992, 1996) and others.  
In Table 1’s second and third columns, by contrast, we do not make any a priori 
assumption about how different partisan and ideological groups should react to different 
amounts of information. Instead, we run separate regressions for Democrats and 
Republicans and let the data tell us whether more information affects them in the same or 
different ways. Similar coefficients on the misconception variable would indicate that 
knowing who pays the estate tax affects Democrats and Republicans in a comparable 
way. 
[Table 1 about here.] 
For both Republicans and Democrats, answering the factual question about estate 
tax coverage incorrectly corresponds to greater support for repealing the estate tax. Our 
analysis, however, puts these effects in a different context. The coefficient for Democrats 
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(.192) is roughly twice as large as that for Republicans (.089). So while Slemrod (2006) 
is correct to say that misconceptions about who pays the estate tax correspond to support 
of its repeal, the effect is much stronger for Democrats than it is for Republicans, even 
when we control for alternative predictors of this policy opinion. 
Information and Opinion on Estate Tax Repeal in the 2002 ANES 
A similar reanalysis of the data used by Bartels (2004, 2005) to characterize 
public support for several of the Bush era tax cuts reveals an even stronger difference 
between Democrats and Republicans. Using the 2002 American National Election 
Studies (ANES), Bartels (2004) concludes that “the persistence of strong public support 
for estate-tax repeal in the face of so many seemingly contrary considerations is very hard 
to square with any notion of public opinion as rational or well-integrated.”  
A difference between Bartels’ analysis and that of Slemrod is that Bartels uses a 
general measure of political information rather than the very specific measure of 
misconception used by Slemrod. Bartels draws conclusions by comparing the opinions of 
citizens whose political information the interviewer rated as high with citizens rated not 
as high. 
We again begin our reanalysis by examining the relationship between political 
information and respondents’ support for the estate tax separately by party identification. 
Figure 2 shows the relationship for the sample as a whole as well as separately for 
Democrats and Republicans.3  
[Figure 2 about here.] 
                                                 
3 Democrats (n = 706) are 47% of the sample (N = 1,511); Republicans (n = 671) are 
44%.  
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On average, people with higher information levels are somewhat more likely to support 
estate tax repeal. Yet the averages hide clear partisan differences. Among Republicans, 
the desire to eliminate the estate tax increases with information. Seventy-eight percent of 
Republican respondents whose information rating was “average” or below supported the 
tax cut. This compares to roughly 88% support by Republicans rated “fairly high” or 
“very high.” Among Republicans, there was a clear consensus in favor of the tax cut – 
particularly for those who were coded as highly informed. For Republicans, the 
relationship between information rating and tax cut opinion is just the opposite of what 
previous articles on estate tax support have suggested. 
Democratic respondents with the highest information levels are seven percentage 
points less likely to support the estate tax repeal than are those rated average or below. 
However, if this finding appears to provide comfort for the idea that ignorance is the key 
cause of support for estate tax repeal, two points are worth making. First, seven 
percentage points is not a large shift. If it was simply ignorance that was causing people 
to support estate tax repeal, there would be a much larger effect. Second, nearly 60% of 
the Democrats with the highest information rating (and nearly 90% of equivalently rated 
Republicans) support the estate tax repeal. By this measure, many well-informed people 
support repeal. 
To control for other influences on respondents’ policy opinions, we analyze the 
same data in Table 2 using the statistical model that Bartels (2005) employed to identify 
the effect of low information levels on support for estate tax repeal. The text of Bartels 
(2005) does not include a statistical model for the effect of information on estate tax 
opinions, but in footnote 55 he describes his claims about the estate tax as coming from a 
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model as “parallel” to his model of support for the 2001 Bush tax cuts. An unpublished 
paper (Bartels 2003) contains this model.  In addition to the interviewer rating of the 
respondent’s level of political information, the model contains the respondent’s income 
and a variable indicating whether the question called the policy in question the “estate 
tax” or the “death tax.” While the original regression (detailed in the first column of 
Table 2) also includes a measure of partisanship as a dependent variable, it does not allow 
political information to affect Democrats and Republicans in different ways. The second 
and third columns constitute our reanalysis and permit such differences to emerge if they 
are present. By running separate regressions for Democrats and Republicans, we let the 
data tell us whether more information affects these partisans in the same or different 
ways. 
The first column reprints Bartels coefficients for the sample as a whole. It shows a 
non-significant coefficient for political information, which is consistent with his  claim 
(2005: 25) that “support for repealing the inheritance tax was virtually constant across 
information levels, controlling for partisanship and family income.” The second and third 
columns tell a different story. While increasing information ratings do make Democrats 
less likely to support the tax cut, the coefficient is not statistically significant. By 
contrast, higher information ratings substantially and significantly increase Republican 
support for the tax cut. In other words, the only statistically significant coefficient on an 
informational variable in Table 2 shows that as Republicans achieve higher information 
levels they are much more likely to support estate tax repeal, even after controlling for 
income.  
[Table 2 about here.] 
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Whether we use the NKK data or the ANES data, our results suggest that relaxing 
the assumption that all respondents, whether Republican or Democrat, must react to 
increased information in an identical manner changes the information-opinion 
relationship. A positive relationship between information and opposition to the estate tax 
repeal emerges only among Democrats.  Among Republicans, the relationship is, if 
anything, the reverse. Furthermore, using either Slemrod’s or Bartels’ measure of 
information, most highly informed Republicans and many highly informed Democrats 
support estate tax repeal. In sum the effect of misconception and ignorance on estate tax 
repeal is limited in scope. 
Experimental Results  
The main difference between the measures of information used by Bartels and 
Slemrod is that only Slemrod draws on a question that tests respondents’ information 
about the estate tax. As described above, the question asks respondents how many 
families have to pay the estate tax. (Bartels uses interviewer assessments of respondents’ 
political information.) In this section, we argue that knowledge questions in traditional 
surveys—such as the one used by Slemrod—underestimate what people know because 
the survey situation does not motivate respondents to search their memories thoroughly 
for the correct answer.  
The pace of a typical survey interview is established in part by conversational 
norms (Schwarz 1996, Chapter 5) and in part by the incentives of the interviewer 
(Kenickell 2000, 2003) and the respondent (Krosnick and Alwin 1987, Blair and Burton 
1987). Such dynamics can lead respondents to satisfice—to offer answers without 
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thinking hard about them—and they can induce interviewers who to ask numerous 
questions within a short period of time to keep the interview “moving along.”  
Since motivation affects how well respondents do in answering knowledge 
questions (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), satisficing attributes of the survey context 
could affect measures of political knowledge. Survey respondents may perform poorly on 
survey-based knowledge tests not because they are incapable of answering the questions, 
but because they are unmotivated to perform well. Specifically, respondents in the NKK 
survey may have given an incorrect or no answer to the question about the estate tax not 
because they could not answer it, but because the interview did not motivate them to try. 
To test this hypothesis, Prior and Lupia (2006) use a novel experimental design. 
The experiment was nested within a representative survey of over 1,200 U.S. residents 
conducted by Knowledge Networks between October 19 and November 1, 2004. One 
randomly selected group of respondents was offered a small monetary reward ($1) for 
each correct answer. Others received no compensation for correct responses.4 
This variation is important to questions of what citizens know about the estate tax 
because the standard way of measuring such knowledge (including NKK’s measure) is to 
place all respondents in the “no compensation” context. The null hypothesis—that 
providing a small monetary incentive for correctly answering knowledge questions 
during a survey interview will not affect the likelihood of offering a correct answer—is 
                                                 
4 More information about the survey and the experimental design is available in Prior and 
Lupia (2006). Prior and Lupia also examine the effect of giving survey respondents extra 
time to answer survey questions. The effect of those treatments on the information-
opinion relationship is comparable in magnitude to those reported here. Our decision to 
focus on the “pay” aspect of our experiment follows from our belief that the NTJ 
audience is more interested in the effect of incentives on behavior than it is with non-
incentive based variations in the survey environment. 
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far from trivial; it is a foundation of the existing literature. The validity of existing claims 
about the magnitude of misconception about the estate tax, and other policies, depends on 
it. 
The Prior-Lupia experiment included the following factual question about the 
percentage of Americans who pay the estate tax: “There is a federal estate tax – that is, a 
tax on the money people leave to others when they die. What percentage of Americans 
leaves enough money to others for the federal estate tax to kick in?” Survey participants 
were offered five response options: “about 95% of all Americans,” “about 70% of all 
Americans,” “about 50% of all Americans,” “about 25% of all Americans,” and “less 
than 5% of all Americans.”5 This question parallels the NKK question used by Slemrod 
for his misconception measure. 
We find that simply offering respondents $1 for a correct answer increased the 
likelihood of a correct response by a third. In our control group (no pay), 36% of 
respondents answered the question correctly. Of the respondents in the treatment group—
who received payment for a correct answer—47% knew that less than 5 percent of all 
Americans have to pay the estate tax. This difference is not only statistically significant 
(t[612] = 2.92, p < .002), but substantively large. 
To be sure, even with monetary incentives, there are still many people who 
answer the question incorrectly. However, this experiment reveals that poor performance 
in previous surveys is driven, in part, by attributes of the survey context. What appears to 
                                                 
5 To reduce the extent to which satisficing could bias our results, we varied the order in 
which these categories were offered to respondents. Roughly half of the respondents 
viewed the categories in the order listed here. The other respondents viewed them in the 
opposite order. We varied response categories in the opinion question in a parallel way. 
This variation does not affect our results.  
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be evidence of ignorance in surveys is partly the product of satisficing induced by the 
interview context itself. As a result, existing reports of how little people know about the 
estate tax (and other tax policies) are exaggerated because traditional surveys repress 
respondents’ motivation to offer correct answers. Public knowledge of the estate tax, in 
other words, is not as low as traditional surveys (including the NKK survey) suggest. 
Conclusion 
Do many citizens lack information about the estate tax? They do. This point is not 
in dispute. The more important question, however, is: Does it matter? One way in which 
citizens’ lack of information can matter is if it fuels support for estate tax repeal. This is 
the relationship that we have explored. While “citizen ignorance” is an easy answer to 
questions about why so many people in the public support estate tax repeal, and while the 
answer is undoubtedly satisfying for elites who want to retain the estate tax, the claim is 
not supported by the data. Republican elites and highly informed Republican citizens 
support repeal by a wide margin. By comparison, highly informed Democrats are split. 
The effect of information—general political information or specific information 
about the estate tax—depends on people’s partisanship. While Democrats become more 
supportive with information, Republicans do not (in the 2002 ANES) or they become 
supportive to a lesser extent (in the NKK Survey). 
We also evaluated the validity of a well-documented measure of estate tax 
misconception. Using an experiment, we demonstrated that existing measures are biased 
by attributes of surveys that inhibit correct responses to fact-based questions. Simply 
providing a monetary incentive caused a substantial rise in the percentage of respondents 
who answered the question correctly.  
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The high number of people (Democrat and Republican) who are, by any of the 
measures used in this paper, highly informed and who support repeal suggests that the 
reasons for overwhelming public support for estate tax repeal must be found in a source 
other than citizen’s ignorance. Reinforcing this conclusion is Bartels’ (2006) analysis of 
why the changes to the estate tax occurred when they did, despite longstanding 
opposition. In this paper, he very effectively documents the estate tax opinions of an 
interesting set of citizens. He pays close attention to the views of a set of citizens who 
might be expected to support progressive taxation. They are people whose personal 
circumstances make them unlikely to pay the estate tax and who say things about 
inequality and tax burdens for the rich that might lead you to think that they would 
support the estate tax. But they do not: 
“[A]mong those with family incomes of less than $50,000 who want more 
spending on government programs and said income inequality has increased and 
said that is a bad thing and said that government policy contributes to income 
inequality and said that rich people pay less than they should in federal income 
taxes – the 11 percent of the sample with the strongest conceivable set of reasons 
to support continuation of the estate tax – 64 percent favored repeal. (Bartels 
2006: 11) 
 
If the accumulated evidence on the topic to date makes anything clear, it is not 
that people dislike the estate tax simply because they are unenlightened, but that many 
observers make overgeneralized and empirically untenable conclusions about why 
citizens hold the opinions that they do.  
Fifty years ago, Schattschneider (1960:135) opined that, “…the implication that 
democracy is a failure because the people are too ignorant to answer intelligently all the 
questions asked by the pollsters…is a professorial invention for imposing professorial 
standards on the political system and deserves to be treated with extreme suspicion.” We 
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agree. In our view, much of the current elite debate on this topic repeats the mistake of 
blaming the public for outcomes over which they have very little control. While many 
readers of this journal have strong professional incentives to know the answers to 
questions such as “What percentage of American families pays the estate tax?,” most 
citizens do not.  
But would the legislative outcome change if citizens knew more? The answer to 
this question depends on what you plan to tell them and who you plan to tell. Many 
supporters of progressive taxation and liberal intellectuals believe that if only citizens 
knew more about the operation of the estate tax, the masses would come to support the 
same forms of taxation as they do. Our analyses, as well as those of Bartels (2006) and 
Slemrod (2006), reveal that such beliefs constitute wishful thinking.  
Indeed, the estate tax opinions of the most informed segments of the public on the 
NKK and ANES surveys are already comparable to those of political elites. Birney, 
Graetz, and Shapiro’s (2006: 18) characterize the congressional coalition that advanced 
estate tax repeal as follows: 
“[B]y June 2000, some of the most liberal members of the House were co-
sponsors of repeal; and sixty-five Democrats had voted for its passage.  The 
situation was similar in the Senate, where the bill passed the Senate 59-39, with 
the support of 9 Democrats.” 
In Congress, Republicans were unanimous in their support of estate tax repeal, 
Democrats were divided.  Our analyses identify a similar pattern amongst citizens. 
Repeal is supported by most highly informed Republicans as well as many highly 
informed Democrats. Such results raise more doubt about claims that citizens, 
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particularly Republicans, support estate tax repeal because they lack information. Indeed, 
it would be hard to argue that the pattern of citizen opinion is a product of ignorance 
while the comparable pattern of elite opinion is not. 
Those who want the estate tax to continue (or more progressive taxation schemes 
to emerge), should operate not from the premise that their opponents disagree with them 
about the estate tax repeal because they are ignorant. Clearly, many people who are 
otherwise regarded as well-informed support estate tax repeal for other reasons. This is 
particularly true for Republicans and remains true even after accounting for income. 
Convincing more people that it is in their interest, and the country’s interest, to retain the 
estate tax or other progressive taxes will require finding out what those reasons are and 
building the counterargument from there. 
Indeed, what seems to some like a set of irrational beliefs and attitudes about 
economy policy could in fact reflect a concern with government involvement at the 
moment of death that overrides economic self-interest and the desire for economic 
redistribution. As Bartels (2006) argues, respect for private property and an aversion 
towards the association of “death and taxes” could explain opposition to the estate tax. It 
may be that citizens are so repulsed by this association that more information would not 
change their opinions. If so, there are many other means of pursuing progressive taxation. 
A prudent thing for supporters of progressive taxation who want to increase the returns of 
their lobbying, or public education efforts, would be to develop alternative taxation plans 
that more citizens are willing to support. 
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Table 1. NKK Reexamination  
Favors eliminating the estate tax  Whole 
Sample 
Democrats 
Only 
Republicans 
Only 
Believes income tax is very complex  .032 .070 .003 
 (.031) (.052) (.040) 
Believes current tax system is unfair  –.036 –.080 –.024 
 (.029) (.050) (.036) 
Believes most families have to pay the estate tax  .112** .192** .089** 
 (.033) (.061) (.040) 
Does not know if most families have to pay the estate tax  .135** .134 .069 
 (.051) (.091) (.066) 
Ages 30–49  .037 -.051 .062 
 (.049) (.075) (.072) 
Ages 50–64  .038 .034 .051 
 (.052) (.079) (.075) 
Ages 65 and above  .109** .055 .077 
 (.055) (.092) (.075) 
Female  .052* .095* -.033 
 (.028) (.050) (.034) 
Race other than white  .010 -.021 -.054 
 (.043) (.063) (.077) 
High school graduate  .003 -.043 .018 
 (.067) (.100) (.095) 
Some college  .062 .002 .110 
 (.064) (.097) (.091) 
College graduate or above  –.052 –.158 –.006 
 (.066) (.099) (.099) 
Income $20,000 to $30,000  .051 .084 .089 
 (.066) (.106) (.079) 
Income $30,000 to $50,000  .056 .084 -.036 
 (.063) (.104) (.091) 
Income $50,000  to $75,000  .104* .117 -.006 
 (.061) (.107) (.088) 
Income $75,000 to $150,000  .049 .015 -.003 
 (.064) (.111) (.090) 
Income more than $150,000  .048 .065 -.032 
 (.068) (.121) (.095) 
Income not reported  .025 .009 .000 
 (.067) (.120) (.095) 
Republican  .175**   
 (.032)   
Neither Republican nor Democrat  .088*   
 (.045)   
Married  .010 -.024 .068 
 (.034) (.058) (.048) 
Has children  .020 .091 -.064 
 (.036) (.060) (.047) 
Suburban  .026 .023 .020 
 (.034) (.055) (.044) 
Rural  .018 .055 -.020 
 (.043) (.075) (.053) 
Constant  .466** .517** .725** 
 (.095) (.130) (.156) 
Observations  985 404 429 
R–squared  .09 .12 .07 
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Table 2: NES 2002 Reexamination 
 
Dependent Variable: Support for/ 
Opposition to the Estate Tax 
Bartels (2003, 
cited in 2005) 
Democrats Republicans 
Political Information  
(0 to 1) 
.043 
(.233) 
-.569 
(.402) 
1.132** 
(.395) 
Republican Party Identification 
(-1 to +1) 
.390** 
(.048) 
  
Family Income  
(in 1000s) 
.001 
(.001) 
.002 
(.002) 
.001 
(.001) 
“Death Tax” wording .049 
(.039) 
.008 
(.067) 
.080 
(.054) 
Constant .345 
(.097) 
.355** 
(.156) 
-.005 
(.190) 
N of Observations 1346 588 569 
 
Positive coefficients indicate increased support for repeal. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at .10 ** significant at .05 
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Figure 1. Information and Opinion by Party in NKK Data 
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Note: In total, 639 respondents answered the question incorrectly, and 407 answered the question correctly. 
Republicans: 258 respondents answered the questions incorrectly and 186 answered the question correctly. 
Democrats: 255 respondents answered the question incorrectly and 165 answered the question correctly. 
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Figure 2. Information and Opinion by Party in the 2002 ANES  
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Note: In total, 458 respondents were rated “Very Low to Average,” 474 were rated “Fairly High,” and 341 
were rated “Very High.” Republicans: 171 respondents were rated “Very Low to Average”, 227 were rated 
“Fairly High,” and 179 were rated as “Very High.” Democrats: 223 respondents were rated “Very Low to 
Average,” 220 were rated “Fairly High” and 179 were rated “Very High.” 
 
 
